Where Are We on the Law of the Sea?

ROBERT B. KRUEGER*

For some time there has been a consensus that the old rules for
the oceans are inadequate. They do not adequately protect the
world's fish supply. For example, Japan, the Soviet Union and other
nations with large foreign fishing fleets conduct massive sweeps
through the coastal waters of other countries, including the United
States, -and cause grave damage to their stocks. There is overfishing on the high seas. A number of species of whales are threatened
with extinction. Rules for conservation are obviously needed.
Manganese nodules that contain commercial and seemingly inexhaustible quantities of copper, nickel, and other minerals can be
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found in many parts of the oceans. Companies in the industrialized
countries have the technology to recover and process these nodules.
Furthermore, man now has the ability to drill for oil in the deep
waters of the continental shelf and slope. The wealth generated
from the recovery of these resources in part could be used to redress
the imbalance between industrialized and developing nations as
part of the new economic order. It follows that we should have
rules to encourage deep water drilling and mineral recovery.
Pollution spirals upward with development and technology. The
massive impact that production and transportation of offshore oil
can have was demonstrated by the Torrey Canyon accident and the
Santa Barbara Channel blowout. The need for a coastal State to
protect itself with a wider contiguous zone than the traditional
three-mile territorial sea has been apparent. We need rules to
protect the marine environment and to establish new zones of national jurisdiction.
Why have we not adopted these much-needed new rules? In 1967
when the United Nations began its work on these issues, there was
the promise of a comprehensive treaty that would make the oceans
"the common heritage of mankind," a principle in fact overwhelmingly approved by the United Nations in 1970. In 1970, also, the
United States proposed a far-reaching oceans regime that would
have reduced the extent of national jurisdiction over coastal resources and created a wide offshore "Trusteeship Zone," the revenues from which would be earmarked for ocean research -and for
use by developing nations. The proposal would have effectively internationalized many potential petroleum resources, and was criticized both in the United States and abroad as naive and a "U.N.
give-away."
The proposal had a number of defects and some of the criticism
was warranted. But, in hindsight, the sheer generosity of its provision identified a fact which has been central to the law of the sea
negotiations: neither the industrialized nor the developing nations
of the world are ready to commit their potential coastal resources
to an international order. While they are willing to give lip service
to the concept of a "common heritage," their actions will be guided
by what they believe will serve their greatest national interest, and

a national interest that appears to have been viewed in a relatively
short time frame. The 1970 United States proposal was the highwater mark of internationalization in law of -the sea negotiations
against which the essentially nationally-oriented maneuvering
which has followed can be measured.
A consensus among nations emerged that there should be an "economic zone" of at least 200 miles in which the coastal State would
control both living and nonliving resources-fishing and oil. There
was no opposition to the concept of the regulation of pollution by
coastal States as long as it met the double standard requirement
of developing nations: they should be permitted to pollute if necessary for their economic development, although industrialized nations could not. A 12-mile -territorial sea was agreed upon, but
there was disagreement as to conditions which could be imposed
upon transit through the many international straits, such as Gibraltar and Malacca, that would be enveloped by coastal jurisdiction.
The United States and the Soviet Union opposed the "innocent passage" concept because they wanted a right of free transit for military vessels, notably nuclear submarines.
A major area of disagreement was the administration for the
deeps, the areas beyond limits of national jurisdiction. The developing countries have neither the technological nor financial ability
to mine the manganese nodules and have worked for -a regime that
would minimize the advantage of the industrialized nations in this
respect. They seek to establish an authority which could authorize
the development of the nodules but would discriminate in favor of
developing countries, control production for the benefit of present
producer nations, mine the nodules for itself and be governed by
bodies controlled by the developing nations. This arrangement is,
of course, unattractive to the industrialized nations. They have
only to look to OPEC to know what to expect.
Certain of these issues are difficult to frame, but it has been the
way in which they have been framed in United Nations negotiations
that has made them particularly difficult to resolve. At Geneva
in 1973, and the following year in Caracas at the first working session of the Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference, no
drafting committee was designated. Instead, each of the delegations was permitted to submit draft articles and working papers,
resulting in hundreds of alternative provisions of varying shades
and differences. In fact, it was considered one of the major accomplishments of Caracas that these myriad proposals were collated
and pieced together, a fact which illustrates the quality of the meeting as much as any other. Virtually no progress was made on
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substantive issues in the ten-week session with most of the time
being absorbed by the. contentious rhetoric of representatives of
developing nations. An additional deterrent to progress was the
pure administrative burden of managing a conference of 150 nations,
each with a seat on the three main committees, the working groups
for which met simultaneously.
It was not until the 1975 session of the Conference in Geneva also
appeared to be on the road to failure that the chairman, Shirley
Amerasinghe of Sri Lanka, requested that the chairman of each of
the three committees prepare a "single negotiating text" so that the
Conference could move in some direction. The result was a draft
of three conventions: the first, dealing with the deep seabed
authority; the second, largely with zones of national jurisdiction;
and the -third,with pollution and scientific research. They proved
to be a decided step forward.
The text of Committee II, prepared by Galindo Pohl of El Salvador, consists of 137 articles and covers the territorial sea and contiguous zone, international straits, the 200-mile economic zone, the
continental shelf, high seas, archipelagos and islands, enclosed and
semi-enclosed seas and the rights of land-locked States. In short,
it covers every subject dealt with by the four 1958 Geneva conventions adopted at the First United Nations Law of the Sea Conference plus a number of other complex subjects. While it contains some drafting defects and points on which there will need
to be further negotiation, the Committee II text is a surprisingly
balanced document considering the circumstances under which it
was produced. It is consistent in most respects with the 1958 conventions and on the important points involved, such as the establishment of the 200-mile economic zone and a 12-mile territorial sea,
the draft is quite adequate. It would clearly authorize a 200-mile
fishery zone of the type proposed in H.R. 200 which was recently
adopted by Congress and would preserve rights of free transit
for ships and aircraft through international straits.
The Committee HI text prepared by Alexander Yankov of Bulgaria consists of 92 articles dealing with the protection of the
marine environment, scientific research and the development and
transfer of technology, some of which were actually negotiated in
the working groups on these subjects. It, too, will require revisions,
but as a negotiating document, it is a quite balanced one which

predictably can be brought into acceptable form. It contains the
dual standard permitting developing countries to pollute, and deals
generally with subjects that do not have a high degree of interest
to them.
Looking solely at the products of Committees II and III of the
Conference, then, one should be reasonably optimistic about the
ability ,ofthe Conference to bring them to a successful conclusion in
the foreseeable future. An element which complicates any such
analysis, however, is the fact that the Committee I single negotiating text prepared by Paul Engo of Cameroon, dealing with deep
seabed resources, is totally imbalanced in favor of the developing
countries, and may not serve as a viable base for negotiations. The
draft, consisting of 75 articles, would create an International Seabed
Authority having exclusive jurisdiction over the seabed and ocean
floor beyond limits of national jurisdiction. It would have the authority to enter into "service contracts, or joint ventures or any
other such form of association which ensures [its] direct and effective control at all times over ...

activities."

The Authority is

required to avoid discrimination except that "[s]pecial consideration by the Authority ... for the interests and needs of the devel-

oping countries, and particularly the land-locked among them, shall
not be deemed to be discrimination." The supreme governing body
of the Authority would be an Assembly on which all states ratifying the convention would have equal representation. A Council
would be elected by the Assembly to act as an executive authority.
Both, therefore, would be controlled by the developing countries.
Finally, an organ of the Authority would be an Enterprise which
could be granted mining rights by the Authority. The implications
of this are apparent. The framework is based upon the stated principle that the seabed and subsoil of deep ocean areas and their resources "are -the common heritage of mankind," but clearly its
function is to award them and revenues from them to the developing countries as part of the "new economic order."
While the United States in Geneva did not accept the concept
of the Enterprise, Secretary of State Kissinger during his speech
to the American Bar Association in Montreal in the summer of 1975,
expressed acceptance of it in principle, if it were to be operated
without discrimination as against competing national entities. Even
with this concession, however, it is questionable whether the Committee I text can be appropriately amended. The very political dynamics that lead to the creation of a draft in the first place-the intransigent demands of the Third World for a redistribution of the
world's wealth-militate against the acceptance of the comprehensive changes that are needed to make this an acceptable document.
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There are those who argue that the United States should enact

into law the 200-mile fishery bill and the proposed Deep Seabed
Hard Minerals Act which would authorize deep seabed mining by
our nationals to show the Third World that we "mean business"
in our negotiations, even prior to the next session of the Conference
in New York in the spring of 1976. While this point of view is not
without some merit, the passage of this type of legislation could

very well impinge upon the negotiating climate. Arguably this
action would be contrary to customary international law or the
Declaration of Principles enacted by the United Nations General
Assembly in 1970. A much more important point, however, is that
this -typeof action could be used as an excuse for delaying or diverting negotiations. The law of the sea negotiations have been underway for eight years and at various times during that period pressures for unilateral action have been cited as one of the excuses for
a lack of progress. We should not provide either our own delegation or any other with an excuse for failure in the important negotiations now underway. If they fail, as they 'probably will with respect to the deep seabeds, we should hopefully have a record -that
will show that we carefully exhausted every reasonable negotiating
opportunity. At that time, careful national action will be appropriate. The game is in overtime; it should be played out.
But will we have a new order for the oceans? Yes, definitely.
If we are very lucky, we may be able to make a breakthrough with
the developing nations on the deeps and obtain a convention in all
areas. Even if we do not, 'however, we should be able to make
the negotiating progress on the other two negotiating texts that
would permit them to become effective. It is, of course, possible
that the developing countries would refuse to ratify these conventions unless their demands for the deeps were met, but this is unlikely if all of the industrialized nations are in accord and the conventions are balanced in content. In any case, history makes it predictable that as to areas in which we do not achieve an agreement
by consensus, the needed new order will evolve through the process
of customary international law by the acts of individual nations,
possibly acting in concert. The order of international law has always followed the need. The new -order of the oceans will follow
the new needs.

